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Professor Mohammed’s paper aims at answering the question of what counts as a good defense 
of an evaluative claim about the conduct of a political agent. If successful, it promises to break 
new grounds in our understanding of political accountability, a fundamental practice in today’s 
liberal democracies. And it promises to do so by combining views concerning the structure of 
evaluative claims and arguments that are available in philosophical and critical-thinking 
literature. 
 After considering some insights from that literature, Professor Mohammed develops her 
own proposal of the ‘scheme’ (which I’ll understand in terms of ‘logical form’) most suitable to 
defend political accountability claims. Her proposal, if sound, would make a contribution to the 
analysis of evaluative arguments beyond those of concern in this paper – i.e., beyond political-
accountability arguments. As acknowledge in the paper, analogous logical forms might underline 
other accountability arguments familiar in the context of institutional bodies charged with an 
accountability role. 
 The success of Professor Mohammed’s project hinges on these two theses:  
 
Thesis 1: There is a link to be found between claims of a certain type and what 
counts as a good defense of them.  
 
Thesis 2: There is a link to be found between (political) accountability claims and 
what counts as a good defense of them.  
 
General thesis 1 seems plausible. After all, for example, empirical claims are commonly 
supported by evidence, or defeated by counterevidence. And a priori claims stand or fall on the 
strength of reasoning alone. But I think that thesis 2, if challenged, would be very difficult to 
defend.  In this commentary, I would like to draw a contrast between that thesis and the more 
modest  
 
Thesis 3: There is a link to be found between claims with normative force and 
what does not count as a good defense of them. 
 
Prominent among philosophical reflection on the logical form of argument for claims with 
normative force are David Hume’s remarks on the Is/Ought gap and G. E. Moore’s Naturalistic 
Fallacy charge. Each of these is consistent with thesis 3, which in turn is compatible with thesis 
2, since they could both be true (or false, as sometimes argued in the case of Hume’s Is/Ought 
gap or Moore’s Naturalistic Fallacy). But thesis 3’s scope is more modest, for it does not assert 
the existence of a positive correlation between claims with normative force and the logical 
structure of any good defense of them.  
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Hume’s and Moore’s insights on the logical form of normative arguments (more on the 
‘normative’ label later) can be regarded as part of a skeptical tradition according to which thesis 
2 is too long a shot. As for other types of claim, normative claims admit of numerous good 
defenses, with no especial link to arguments of a particular kind. Given skepticism of this sort, 
the quest for an argument form that provides the best defense of a normative claim about the 
conduct of a political agent would turn out to be futile. Furthermore, the burden of arguing would 
be on the anti-skeptic camp.  
In what follows, I’ll explore whether the material covered in Professor Mohammed’s 
paper can meet this challenge, which requires arguing persuasively for a positive link between 
accountability claims and the argument scheme that is best suited to defend them. But first, let’s 
consider some terminological issues. 
Although as noted by Professor Mohammed the fact/value distinction have been under 
scrutiny for some time, for the purpose of argument analysis it is helpful to distinguish 
judgments that exclusively make a factual claim (e.g., ‘Mr. Williams was denied kidney-
dialysis’) from those that also have normative force (e.g., ‘Denying kidney-dialysis to Mr. 
Williams was wrong’). The former judgments are commonly called ‘purely descriptive’; the later 
‘normative.’ Evaluative judgments and prescriptions can be regarded as making up the category 
of normative judgment – i.e., judgments with normative force. If ‘Dead is bad,’ then that is 
usually a reason for avoiding measures that hasten or cause death: such is the normative force of 
that evaluative judgment. To evaluate Major Petersen as corrupt agent is to make a judgment 
with a certain normative force: it provides a reason for thinking that he has engaged in activities 
that are forbidden for a public official. On this framework, accountability judgments are not only 
evaluations using terms such as ‘Agent A’s performance was satisfactory’ (or ‘honest,’ 
‘efficient,’ ‘wasteful,’ etc.). They can also consist in backward- or forward-looking prescriptions 
such as ‘The Major should not have put pressure on state workers to vote for her’ (backward 
looking prescription of accountability) and ‘This Major should provide evidence that her taxation 
of cigarettes will have an impact on public health’ (forward looking prescription of 
accountability). If I am right, the picture that emerges has, on the one side, purely descriptive 
judgments and on the other, something like this 
 
 
 
Normative Judgments 
(propositions, claims, etc.) 
PRESCRIPTIONS
Any judgment to the 
effect that an action or 
measure is obligatory, 
forbidden or permissible
EVALUATIONS
Any judgment that 
ascribes postitive or 
negative fetures to things 
(persons, practices, 
policies)
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With this taxonomy in mind, let’s now turn to the argument forms that might provide good 
structures for defending normative accountability judgments. Here Professor Mohammed’s 
proposal is first inspired in what she refers to as an evaluative symptomatic argument scheme 
(hereafter, ‘ESAS”), which runs as in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Here, x is a political agent, z is a descriptive property or set of properties concerning that agent’s 
performance (having followed established procedures, managed the budget, etc.), and y is an 
associated evaluative property (satisfactory, efficient, wasteful, corrupt, etc.).  
But as a representation of the logical form of an argument, the scheme in Figure 1 is 
extremely odd: why put the conclusion first? Why make a semantic ascent from ‘x is y’ or ‘x has 
property y’ to the cumbersome ‘y is true of x’? Translated into a standard argument form, ESAS 
would become the plausibility argument form in Figure 2, a familiar structures from defenses of 
different types of claim. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
y is true of x,  
because z is true of x 
   and   z is an indicator of y  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Plausibly, anything that has z has y  
x has property z  
Plausibly, x has property y 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 (Mohammed 2016: 6) 
Figure 2 
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To Figure 1 basic structure, Professor Mohammed adds Govier & Allen’s 2011 notion of a 
conductive argument, which is one whose premises independently contribute to supporting its 
conclusion. She thus obtain more complex schemes that share Figure 1 basic structure. The 
schemes can be adapted to apply to negative evaluations of inefficient or otherwise 
unsatisfactory performance of a political agent. Here is an example of simple ESAS: 
 
I now submit that more needs to be said before skepticism about Professor Mohammed’s thesis 2 
can be ruled out. For recall that is the thesis that accountability claims are especially linked to 
logical forms that are good vehicles for their defense. But the argument in Figure 3 also admits 
reconstruction by means of a plausibility logical form along the lines of Figure 2. Once that’s 
done, it has not tendency to suggest any especial link between the accountability claim that an 
executive agent’s conduct is satisfactory and a particular argument form that best serves the 
purpose of defending that claim.  
 
Satisfactory conduct is true of the executive agent A  
 
because having policies/plans/action which are in line with the collective goals is true of A 
   and  having policies/plans/action which are in line with the collective goals is an 
indicator of satisfactory conduct  
 
 Figure 3 (Mohammed 2016: 9) 
